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Young workersa b s t r a c t
Inexperienced workers are more prone to experience occupational injuries. By definition, a work accident
is a sudden or unforeseen event that contributes to an injury. This pilot study aimed to understand the
relationship between unforeseen events, their contributing factors, the responses to these events, and
the injury risks among young apprentices.
Nine apprentices (15–17 yr old) in different companies were videotaped whilst doing normal work
tasks (total 79.5 h). Unforeseen events were described according to an observation grid constructed for
this study; the following variables were characterized: unforeseen events, immediate contributing fac-
tors, strategies (individual vs. collective) and injury risk. All unexpected events observed by trained raters
were coded (n = 554). Simple logistic regressions were made to determine the odd of being at risk of
injury. The variable ‘‘activity sector” was used as control. Falling/dropping object (25.5%) is the most
prevalent unexpected event (UE). The most important contributing factor is related to Material/products
(44.1%), and Individual strategies were most frequently used by apprentices (81.5%). However, regres-
sions showed that UE related to Handling and Equipment are the most associated with injury risks.
Collective strategies to manage UE seem to have a protective role. This study illustrates the duality
associated with unexpected event: the potential of those events to develop competencies or the risk of
injury associated. Some implications for schools, decision-makers and employer are discussed.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Many cross-sectional studies and literature reviews indicate
that workers in the first few months of their job (i.e., new workers)
have an increased risk of work injury (Shaw et al., 2001; Crook
et al., 2002; Breslin and Smith, 2006; Breslin et al., 2007; Lidal
et al., 2007; Laberge and Ledoux, 2011; Morassaei et al., 2013). This
elevated risk remains even when sociodemographic and work-
related variables (e.g., occupation) are controlled (e.g., Morassaei
et al., 2013). An increased risk of injury among new workers is of
particular concern for young workers and those who engage in
temporary employment because by moving from job to job theyrepeatedly expose themselves to this ‘‘high-risk” phase of
employment.
This high risk for newly hired workers could be explained by a
combination of unfamiliarity with identifying and controlling haz-
ards, and a lack of effective safety training (Breslin and Smith,
2006). Efforts to reduce work injury include the identification of
risk factors (e.g., hazards) and implementing prevention programs
to eliminate hazards or reduce workplace risks.
Despite this body of knowledge, injuries continue to occur in
workplaces. In actual work situations, workers may not base their
work strategies on aggregated statistical knowledge but, rather on
contextual factors, such as variability or incidental situations. Thus
actionable information requires microanalysis of contextual set-
tings. By definition, according to the Quebec Act Respecting Indus-
trial Accidents and Occupational Diseases, an industrial accident
means a sudden and unforeseen event, attributable to any cause,
which happens to a person, arising out of or in the course of his work
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situations, the capacity to avoid an accident depends on strategies
developed when a situation changes and then, on the experience
gained encountering subsequent similar situations. It is thus linked
to job learning processes. Several authors discuss this topic in
terms of work interruption and work recovery. Work interruptions
are known to contribute to accidents and decrease productivity in
domains such as aviation, hospitals, and offices (Boehm-Davis and
Remington, 2009). Leplat (2011) defined ‘‘work interruption” as a
rupture in the normal action course that is caused by internal or
external events. Many situations can be associated with an inter-
ruption, such as distraction, memory failure, unexpected demands,
and obstacles. The main focus of this article is those events that can
induce an interruption among non-experienced young workers.
Perrenoud (1999), who had greatly contributed to the advanc-
ing of education sciences by his approach to competency-based
development, explains two types of unexpected event:
 those that can be expected, but the time of the occurrence is
not; this can be called ‘‘relatively unexpected” or
 those that are completely unforeseen or new to the worker; this
can be called ‘‘completely unexpected”.
The concept of uncertainty is essential to understand how such
events generate reactions that might be associated to an accident.
Leplat (2011) brings up the premise of the accident analysis
method developed by the French Institut National de Recherche et
de Sécurité (INRS): If things had happened as planned, the accident
would not arise. In this assumption, the analysis consists to seek
the sources of the accident in the variations of the situation. In
actual context, unexpected events such as breakdowns or malfunc-
tions, compel workers to change their work strategies to restore
the situation and reach the objectives, despite what happened
(Noulin, 2002). This mechanism is called recovery. It is closely
linked to the «self-regulation process» described by Leplat (2011)
and St-Vincent et al. (2014). The self-regulation process is a
constant adaptive process to cope with variability. ThisFig. 1. Modified version of the Human Aself-regulation process is expressed in work activities and can be
observable via different strategies and actions in function of the
context (St-Vincent et al., 2014). Apprenticeships are intended as
a period to learn these self-regulatory skills.
Perrenoud (1999) explained how the capacity to master unfore-
seen events corresponds to high level of competency; it seems to
be the challenge of situational learning. Therefore, for an appren-
tice, unexpected situations are mostly completely new (second
scenario); gradually, those situations become ‘‘relatively unex-
pected”. Through this process, work strategies are developed, first
randomly, and then, planned and refined. At the end, a repertory of
appropriate ‘‘know-how” is created and can be used in the right sit-
uation, especially to avoid injuries. Many researchers described
this phenomenon as the protective role of experience (St-Vincent
et al., 1989; Cloutier, 1994; Millanvoye and Colombel, 1996;
Avila-Assunçao, 1998; Gaudart and Weill-Fassina, 1999; Vézina
et al., 1999; Gonon, 2003; Chassaing, 2004; Cloutier et al., 2005;
Denis et al., 2007; Ouellet, 2009). Another protective factor accord-
ing to Caroly (2010) concerns the collective activity regulation
(e.g., interactions with co-workers and supervisors on how to
respond to unexpected events); this process allows a better divi-
sion of tasks and different knowledge sharing opportunities about
work situations.
The conceptual frame used in this study is the Human Activity
Self-Regulatory Process model (Shaw et al., 2013) derives from
Activity Theory (Vygotsky, 1978; Leontyev, 1978) and based on
methods of work activity analysis developed by ergonomists
(Vézina, 2001; Guérin et al., 2007; St-Vincent et al., 2014;
Laberge et al., 2014) (see Fig. 1). The model describes how determi-
nants of work activity, by the self-regulatory process they induce,
might factor into a worker’s ability to overcome health problems
and maintain productivity. Concretely, this model sees workers
in a continual process of self-regulation whilst carrying out job
tasks in relation to work context: employer demands and expecta-
tions, conditions and means provided by the employer, as well as
social context. Decisions about how to perform work activities in
connection with context is a constant struggle to maintainctivity Self-Regulatory Process model.
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and the benefits of physical and mental well-being. In this model,
an injury arises when the worker is unable to balance work
demands with his own capacity to self-regulate the situation,
due to a weak margin of manoeuvre (MM). This concept can be
defined as an operational leeway that a worker has or not to prop-
erly self-regulate its work activities (via some cognitive strategies
for instance), i.e. without adverse consequences on health or per-
formance. Margin of manoeuvre is not the same concept as flexibil-
ity or latitude because for a novice worker, having latitude without
knowing how to properly do an operation can lead to a weaker MM
(i.e. being unable to self-regulate activities without adverse conse-
quences). This model is coherent with Rasmussen safety theory
that recommends changing simple human error analysis based
on specific action sequences by a model of behavior shaping mech-
anisms in terms of work system constraints, boundaries of accept-
able performance, and subjective criteria guiding adaptation to
change (Rasmussen, 1997).
The Quebec Ministry of Education implemented a new voca-
tional training program that specifically targets students with
learning difficulties (15–18 year-olds), a vulnerable population
for occupational injury. In this vocational program, called Training
for a Semiskilled Trade (TST) program, apprentices are expected to
learn work skills in an actual workplace through an apprenticeship
of 300 h over one scholar year. Many of the ensuing jobs may
involve risk factors for occupational injuries, like manual handling
or manipulation of chemical products for instance (Laberge et al.,
2010). The principal training modality in this program consists of
on-the-job training.
A recent action research study pointed out that apprentices
enrolled in the TST program deal regularly with new tasks, atypical
situations, unforeseen events, and they are not prepared to give an
appropriate response when it happens (Laberge et al., 2014).
Sorock et al. (2004) illustrated also that the relative risk of an occu-
pational acute hand injury was increased when working with
equipment, tools, or work pieces not performing as expected, when
using a different work method, and when doing an unusual task,
being distracted, and being rushed. However, considering a learn-
ing perspective, it can be worthwhile to develop more general
adaptive strategies that allow one to respond even to unexpected
events, as suggested by Perrenoud (1999). This kind of event can
thus be considered as an opportunity to achieve competencies, in
particular if the apprentice can rely on colleagues to avoid negative
consequence.
This article presents findings from a larger study that aimed to
develop a tailored OHS training approach adapted to apprentices
with learning difficulties. The broad study used mixed methods
to develop an intervention (see methodological details in Laberge
et al., 2012). The larger study was based on fieldwork, making
use of observations and interviews. It provided insight into the
variety of processes that characterize actual work activities and
conditions. For the purpose of this pilot study, only a part of the
broad study material was analyzed. The purpose of the article
was to gain a better understanding of the relationship between
unforeseen events, their apparent contributing factors, the conse-
quent strategies and injury risks among young apprentices
enrolled in the Quebec Training for Semiskilled Trade (TST) pro-
gram. Using a case-study design, this pilot study examined our
hypotheses about the protective role of experience and also, the
protective role of surrounding colleagues when an unexpected
event happens. Those results are important for prevention strate-
gies; they do not necessarily suggest the elimination of unexpected
situations, but rather, a better comprehension of them in regard to
the individual learning process and their impact on health and
safety.2. Material and methods
2.1. Material and participants
Extensive observations from a previous ergonomics interven-
tion study were used to identify how unforeseen events were han-
dled by apprentices and their surroundings. This study obtained an
ethical certificate from the University of Quebec in Montreal ethi-
cal committee. Nine subjects from 15 to 17 years of age consented
to participate to the ergonomics intervention study and accepted
that the data can be used for subsequent analysis if needed, for
5 years after the end of the first study. Subjects were videotaped
by a team of two research associates, one filming over-the-
shoulder following them everywhere, and the other one taking
notes about contextual information that was not caught by the
camera. Apprentices were asked to do their normal tasks at their
TST apprenticeship in eight different companies (see Table 1).
The apprentices were told to work normally. As described in
Laberge et al. (2012), there is no precise specification for hands-
on training; following very broad specifications, the companies
are almost completely in charge of the training program. In fact,
observations and interviews showed that the training program is
essentially informal and inequal from one workplace to another
one. The stipulations and actual training practices are described
in Laberge et al. (2012) and Laberge et al. (2014). They were all
filmed twice in their apprenticeship, for a whole day shift. For
those apprentices, a normal shift varies from roughly five to six
hours per day – coffee breaks and lunch times were cut from video
data. A total of 79.5 h of work time was captured. Table 1 presents
the principal characteristics and information pertaining to the nine
participants. The participant sample was small, but appropriate for
a multiple case study design. Consequently, the videotaped mate-
rial was analyzed completely (no sample strategy).2.2. Observation grid
To describe unforeseen events, an observation grid has been
built (see variables in Table 2). Inspired by the Human Activity
Self-regulatory Process model, the following variables have been
characterized: unforeseen events, immediate contributing factors,
strategies (individual and collective, corresponding to social
support in the model) and health consequences in terms of injury
risk. Those variables were defined in agreement with two
researchers.
The values and observation criteria for each variable were
determined following a mix of inductive and deductive strategies.
Unexpected event categories derive partly from literature review,
and from what the material suggests. For instance, Sorock et al.
(2001) determined different classes of unusual tasks or events
related to injury risk, such equipment or material, unusual tasks,
or working under pressure. In the actual study, the material comes
from observations rather than questionnaire, so new categories
were added. For the inductive part of categorization, the whole
video material has been viewed and then categories were estab-
lished by agreement between two scientists. Observation criteria
are presented in Table 3.
It should be noticed that for the variable ‘‘strategies”, the cate-
gories were declined in function of its individual or collective char-
acter. The individual strategies correspond to those developed only
by the apprentices without help or colleague interventions. The
collective strategies involved other people surrounding the
apprentice (supervisor or colleagues). Those strategies can be initi-
ated by the apprentice (asking for help) or the other person
involved (help given, training given or feed-back given).
Table 1
Participants.
Sex Apprenticeship Job category Company type Tasks Duration
of obs (h)
1 2
1 M Woodworker Wood/metal
processing
Large wood transformation company Prepare, carry and check quality of wood pieces 4.7 6.0
2 M Assistant Welder Wood/metal
processing
Small steel fabrication company Operate steel cutting machine (W1), weld
simple metal pieces (W2)
5.1 1.6b
3 M Printer’s Assistant Printing Small familial printer company Operate computerized printers; assemble and
wrap printed products or photocopies, handle
printed material and sheets
5.2 4.5
4 F Clothing Stock handler Retail trade Branch of a large clothing company Receive, prepare and arrange clothing and
shoes to sale; operate a cash machine (T2 only)
3.9 4.3
5 M Pharmacy Inventory Clerk Retail trade Branch of a large pharmacy company Carry merchandise to shelving area; arrange
merchandise in the sales area (drugs,
cosmetics)
4.4 4.6
6 M Pharmacy Inventory Clerk Retail trade Same company as apprentice 5 Idem 4.2 4.6
7 M E-Commerce Inventory
Clerk
Retail trade Branch of a large e-commerce
company
Receive merchandise in the back store; arrange
merchandise in the sales area
–a 4.4
8 M Butcher’s Assistant Food preparation Branch of a large supermarket
company
Prepare, cut, wrap and carry meat product,
clean the workplace
5.2 5.3
9 M Cook’s Assistant Food preparation Small bistro restaurant Prepare, cut and cook simple meals 5.4 5.6
a Note that one of the apprentices could only be filmed once due to employer approval delay.




1. Unforeseen, unexpected events An event that can be expected, but improbable at the time or a fully unprecedented event – can be a new situation for
instance. It implies a work disruption
2. Apparent contributing factors The most obvious and observable factor preceding the unexpected event (e.g. equipment breakdown). This variable
could involve more than one factor if it is not possible to isolate a unique one. Hypothesis or supposition cannot be
identified (e.g.: judgmental error – this cannot be observable)
3. Consequent strategies (personal or
collective)
For this variable, we can code two kinds of strategies: ones from the apprentices (personal strategies) or ones from the
surrounding workers (social support). A strategy is the way of doing considering the unexpected event. This could
involve doing nothing (ignoring the unexpected event). Again, the coding strategies must be observable (no
supposition)
4. Health consequence in terms of injury risk
(expert evaluation)
The event induces an injury risk (by itself or consequently to the strategy employed). This variable implies an expert
judgment. The coder is an ergonomist trained in observation methods and injury risk
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The coding was done in two stages. First, the whole material
was viewed by an experienced observer. This stage led to the iden-
tification of all unforeseen events filmed and to categorize them
according to the observation grid (Table 3 – Unforeseen events).
For each event, the apprentice and the time code was identified
using the software Captiv, suited for collecting video data. A total
of 554 unexpected events were identified. In a second stage, the
experienced observer selected all events and analyzed them one
by one to categorize other variables (Table 3 – contributing factors,
strategies and injury risks). Variables were coded by one observer.
Each time, she rated her level of confidence about her coding (zero
to 100% confident). When a variable had a level of confidence
below 75%, another experienced coder was asked to approve the
coding. For those events, the final value was determined by con-
sensus. Table 4 indicates the number of situations where a consen-
sus has to be made for each variable.
The variable ‘‘injury risk” was coded according to observable
indicators. Different kinds of injury risks were identified. The type
of injuries and their observable indicators are presented in Table 5.
An injury risk was coded if any of the following situations was
observed whilst the event happened.2.4. Analysis
Data was first presented by number and frequency for each
variable. To determine which kind of events, contributing factors
and strategies are the most related to injury risk, logistic regres-
sions models were used. The variable ‘‘injury risk” was used as
the dependent variable as the others are the independent variables.
In addition, considering that unexpected events are unequally dis-
tributed between apprentices, the variable ‘‘activity sector” was
used as control; the apprentices were grouped in four job cate-
gories: retail trade, metal/wood manufacturing, food preparation
and printing industry (see Table 1). This control variable was added
in the model to reduce the estimation’s bias on the parameters of
interest. In addition, for each variable, categories that count for
5% or less were merged together. To simplify the regression, for
the variable ‘‘strategies”, only two categories were distinguished:
the individual strategies were regrouped together, as well as the
collective ones. For each independent variable, a reference category
was determined, it is the category used to compare the other; the
lower category has been chosen for each variable (falling/dropping
object for the variable ‘‘unexpected event”, work technique for the
variable ‘‘contributing factor” and collective strategies for the vari-
able ‘‘strategy”).
Table 3
Variable categories and observation criteria.
Variables Categories Observation criteria
Unexpected events 1. Collision (structure, object,
person)
The apprentice strikes or is struck by a moving or stationary object with or without
intermediate (e.g. buggy)
2. Falling or dropping object An object falls on the floor (from the apprentice hands or from an external structure near the
apprentice)
3. Difficulty handling material An object is unstable in the hands (e.g. It near misses to fall, it seems to be hard to contain or
retain. . .)
4. Unstable load A product is unstable on an external structure (boggy, jigger, shelf,
5. Equipment difficulty The apprentice has difficulty handling the equipment (machine) or the equipment does not
work properly or stops during the task
6. Action failure, mistake, quality
reject
The apprentice makes a mistake or the quality is rejected. The mistake or the quality reject has
to be validated by a supervisor, a colleague or another observable indicator
7. Slip, fall The apprentice slips, falls or comes close to
8. Not finding something (product,
material)
The apprentice does no find an item, a product or material he looks around for (e.g. go back and
forth in the aisle, hesitation sign, . . .)
9. Difficulty handling PPE The apprentice has problem in putting on or keeping the PPE (remove, replace, take time to put
on, force to put on)
Apparent contributing
factors
1. Being rushed The apprentice looks rushed (sign: running, walking fast, moving fast)
2. Being disturbed or interrupted A external event (e.g. signal) or a person (e.g. client, supervisor, colleague) disrupt the current
task
3. Equipment maintenance or
design
The event is related to a mismatch of the interface equipment – product or material (the
equipment would be ok with another product). The machine or the equipment breakdowns or
works badly
4. Material, products (misplaced,
unusual, missing, badly designed)
The contributing factor is related to the material (e.g. wood, tissue, metal, paper. . .) or the
product handled (box, item, can. . .). It could be linked to the design or to the proprieties of the
material or product
5. Action or work technique The contributing factor is related to an inappropriate work technique (experience) and
apparently not related to an external conditions (ex: workplace layout, work organization,
etc.).
6. Misfit, misconception PPE The PPE doesn’t fit the personal apprentice characteristics
7. Workplace layout Workplace station poorly designed; poor storage setup
8. Poor housekeeping, maintenance Workplace station cluttered, congested, encumbered; obstacles on floor; structures are
damaged (ex: cracks on the floor)
9. Not possible to determine (or
other contributing factors)
The contributing factor cannot be extracted by observation or any other contributing factors
Strategies Individual 1. Continue to work Continue the current action as if nothing happened
2. Action repetition The apprentice redo the action in the same way, trying again with the same gestures
3. Try to solve The apprentice try to find a solution by changing method
4. Additional task The event lead to an additional task (unwanted, unexpected) not to solve the problem but as a
necessary consequence of the problem (e.g.: clean up a spill)
Collective 5. Asking for help When the apprentice asks by his own the help of a co-worker, supervisor or other person
6. Help given When a co-worker, a supervisor or another person take the initiative of helping the apprentice
without request
7. Training given When someone around give some advice or show how to proceed to resolve the situation or to
avoid experiencing it again
8. Feedback given When a supervisor or a co-worker give a positive or a negative feedback
Injury risks – Yes
– No




1. Events (n = 554) 46 8.3
2. Contributing factors (n = 565) 67 11.9
3. Strategies (n = 604) 33 5.5
4. Injury risks (n = 554) 36 6.5
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3.1. Descriptive statistics
A total of 554 events were observed in the 79.5 h of observation
among the nine apprentices. For each unexpected event, the appar-
ent contributing factors (n = 565), consequent strategies (n = 604)
and injury risks (n = 554) were coded. For some events, two con-
tributing factors or strategies were identified. Table 6 shows unex-
pected events collected among the nine apprentices, their
contributing factors, consequent strategies and the injury risks in
terms of effective and frequency.The unexpected events ‘‘falling/dropping object”, ‘‘action failure
– quality reject”, ‘‘not finding something” and ‘‘equipment difficul-
ties” are the most common and together, they count for 75% of the
unexpected events. The prevalence of the event ‘‘falling/dropping
object” is related to the fact that most apprentices are assigned
to stock handler jobs and they frequently drop products. They all
have to handle products, material or merchandise, in particular
those in the retail trade sector (4 participants). The unexpected
event ‘‘action failure or quality reject”, potentially related to low
job tenure (experience) represents 17% of the unexpected events,
which is the second highest.
Due to the eleven events attributed to two contributing factors,
the total number of recorded contributing factors is 565 over the
nine apprentices. On their own, the contributing factors ‘‘material,
products”, ‘‘workplace layout”, ‘‘action/work technique” represent
84.25% of all contributing factors. One contributing factor in five
has been attributed to work technique, a category which could
probably be explained by low job tenure.
Due to the fifty events leading to two strategies, the total num-
ber of recorded strategies is 604 over the nine apprentices. The
Table 5
Observation of injury risks.
Example of injury risks Observable indicators
Sudden musculoskeletal
injury
Extreme posture, such + 90 back flexion (note that it was not the objective of this article to develop a detailed evaluation or the posture; the
coder is a well-trained ergonomist, she used her knowledge in the domain of biomechanical constraints to determine what is an extreme
posture for each articulation), or
Excessive force observed by face movements, associate reactions, compensatory strategies, very low speed when handling object
Falls or trips When the apprentice climb in unstable or unguarded structure or when the apprentice walk on a uneven floor
Moving objects When an object falls on the apprentice or very close
Being crushed or caught When the apprentice put his/her hands in a machine/structure at risk of moving
Cuts When the apprentice use a cutting object inappropriately
Burns Contact with hot or warm object or material (e.g. opened oven, heat sealer, welding machine)
Table 6
Prevalence of unexpected events, contributing factors, strategies and injury risks
observed among nine apprentices.
N %
Unexpected events (n = 554)
Falling/dropping objects 142 25.63
Action failure, quality reject 97 17.51
Not finding something 96 17.33
Equipment difficulty 89 16.06
Difficulty handling material 75 13.54
Difficulty handling PPE 29 5.23
Collision 12 2.17
Unstable load 9 1.63
Slip, fall 5 0.90
Total Events 554 100.00
Contributing factors (n = 565)
Material, products 249 44.07
Workplace layout 118 20.89
Action or work technique 109 19.29
Equipment 37 6.55
Misfit, misconception PPE 30 5.31
Not possible to determine by observation 12 2.12
Poor housekeeping, maintenance 5 0.89
Being disturbed or interrupted 3 0.53
Being rushed 2 0.35
Total Contributing factors 565 100
Strategies (n = 604)
Individual
Additional task 195 32.28
Continue to work 109 18.05
Action repetition 95 15.73
Try to solve 93 15.40
Total individual strategies 492 81.5
Collectives
Training given 51 8.44
Asking for help 39 6.46
Help given 13 2.15
Feedback given 9 1.49
Total collective strategies 112 18.5
Total Strategies 604 100
Injury risk observed (n = 554)
Yes 105 19.0
No 449 81.0
Total events 554 100
6 M. Laberge et al. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 1–9large majority of those strategies are individual (81.5%). Still, 112
strategies involved other people, colleagues or supervisors for
instance. 65% of those collective strategies are initiated by the
other person rather than the apprentice (help, training and feed-
back given) while 35% are initiated by the apprentice (asking for
help). The collective strategies are only possible when someone
else is nearby. The collective strategies initiated by others imply
that the other person supervises the apprentice and sees him face
some problems.Here is the distribution of the strategies for the 554 unexpected
events when they are regrouped as either individual or collective
strategies:
 444 events lead to individual strategies only;
 93 events lead to collective strategies only;
 17 events lead to both strategies. When it happens, the collec-
tive strategy follows almost all the time the individual one
(16/17).
3.2. Logistic regression
Association have been made between specific unexpected
events, apparent contributing factors or strategies (collective or
individual) and the observation of an injury risk. For each of these
three associations, the effects estimated by the logistic regression
are presented in Table 7. In each case, the reference category was
always the one associated with the smallest risk. First, for unex-
pected events, we found that two types of events were significantly
different than the reference category (p-values < 0.0001). The data
analysis shows that the odds of injury risk is 29.2 times higher
when the category of event concerns the manipulation of equip-
ment compared to the reference category (falling/dropping object),
and the odds of risking an injury is 43.6 times higher if the unex-
pected event concerns manual handling difficulties. This last unex-
pected event is not very frequent compared to the others (only
13.5% of events); however this is by far the most associated with
injury risk.
As for the contributing factor, the work technique was the ref-
erence category because it was the contributing factor having the
smallest risk of being in presence of an injury. The logistic regres-
sion reveals that, from all the other contributing factors consid-
ered, the equipment (maintenance or design) is the only
contributing factor having significantly higher odds (p-
value < 0.01). The model estimated that the odds of being in pres-
ence of an injury risk are 3.815 times higher when equipment is
involved.
For the unexpected event and its contributing factor, it may be
noted that the categories potentially attributed to low experience
are less likely to be associated with an injury risk (action failure,
mistake, quality reject and work technique). It seems that manual
handling and equipment have to be monitored or managed care-
fully with novice workers, not necessarily in terms of training
(work technique) but in terms of work conditions and assignment.
Finally, for the variable ‘‘strategy”, the findings show a signifi-
cantly greater association between individual strategies and injury
risk compare to when the apprentice benefits from collective
strategies to manage unexpected events (p-value < 0.001). We
can see from Table 7 that the use of collective strategies yields odds
of being in presence of an injury risk that are 5.2 times smaller.
Those results seem to confirm the protective role of the surround-
ings at work. As the results suggest, supervision and mentoring are
certainly a resource for learning and probably for safety too.
Table 7
Odds ratios (OR) of being in presence of an injury risk given the unexpected event, its
contributing factor and the type of strategy to solve it.
OR
Unexpected event
Difficulty handling material 43.6**
Equipment difficulty 29.2**
Action failure, quality reject 3.1
Not finding something 1.2










Collective strategy (ref) 1
* p value < 0.01.
** p value < 0.001.
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In the province of Quebec (Canada), the law stipulates that
every employer must ‘‘give the worker adequate information as
to the risks connected with his work and provide him with the
appropriate training, assistance or supervision to ensure that he
possesses the skill and knowledge required to safely perform the
work assigned to him” (AOHS, art. 51.91). The unexpected events
that are the most associated with injury risks are related to equip-
ment or material/products. Those findings confirm what Sorock
et al. (2001) showed, that the most important factors associated with
hand injuries are related to equipment or materials that performed
differently.
The management of unexpected events in a workplace are a rel-
evant object in regard to in-situ learning processes, integration to
work in general, and OHS prevention in particular. This study
enriched several hypotheses that stems from case studies and
qualitative studies in the field of ergonomics that have showed
how specific work conditions can foster job learning and occupa-
tional safety and health. This confirms that an unexpected event
cannot be seen only as injury risk factor but also, as a learning
opportunity (Perrenoud, 1999). Moreover, it seems that mistakes
and quality rejections, often attribute to the action or work tech-
nique according to the observation, are not the most associated
with injury risk, contrary to what many studies assumed. In this
respect, Wallace et al. (2006) stipulate that the human error has
often been wrongly considered as the principal source of work-
place injury. In the current study, the findings suggest that other
contributing factors may be considered keys in injury prevention,
like work conditions (equipment, material) or task (manual
handling).
In this study, several unexpected events were attributed to two
contributing factors, material or product problems as well as to
action or working technique. It illustrates that it is sometimes hard
to completely separate the external environment and the internal
processes associated to human decision. This difficulty in discern-
ment again leads to the question: what can explain the most injury
risk for novice workers: their personal characteristics (physical or
intellectual ability, skills, knowledge. . ..) or the working conditions
offered? The importance of both causal factors in the occurrence of
an unexpected event has also been pointed out by Leplat (2011).1 L.R.Q. c. S-2.1.For this author, a breakdown in the course of action is due to a
pairing of internal and external sources, as lack of competence
combined with deficient technical/organizational conditions. Con-
sequently, unexpected event is inextricably linked to both internal
and external components, each being evaluated with respect to the
other (Leplat, 2011 p.96). That being said, it is well known that the
target ‘‘behavior change” is less effective than the reduction or the
elimination of exposure in terms of prevention (Goggins et al.,
2008). Then it would be appropriate to rethink our prevention
strategies for young workers who are too often only directed
toward awareness and education campaigns without modification
of work practices or policies.
The unexpected events categorized under ‘‘difficulty handling
material” are more likely to be associated with injury risk for
novice workers. Other studies have found similar results in manual
handling tasks among new workers (Harkness et al., 2003). The job
title ‘‘stock handler” counted for the highest injuries rate among
young workers (this category explained 19% of the injuries that
hurt young workers in Quebec) (CSST, 2013). In the current study,
among all unexpected events, the handling difficulties ended up in
fifth rank and nevertheless, they are the first one regarding injury
risk association. This finding may be compared to those obtained
by Plamondon et al. (2010) and Denis et al. (2007, 2013) who have
demonstrated that expert and novice stock handlers do not use the
same techniques to lift and carry manual loads. In fact, expert stock
handlers use techniques considered safer (Plamondon et al., 2010)
and use different strategies to decrease physical workload (Denis
et al., 2007). Those results can probably explain, at least partly,
the finding obtained by Breslin and Smith (2006) who observed
injury rate differences according to job tenure. Thus, the present
study continues to highlight the need for detailed assessment
and theory on what is unexpected in the workplace from a new
worker perspective.
4.1. The contribution of social environment to safety
The responses to unexpected events are also an important issue
in reducing new worker risk. Even if the observation showed that
apprentices used mainly individual strategies to solve unexpected
events, some apprentices had a greater use of collective strategies.
A detailed analysis by apprentice revealed that the apprentice 3, 8
and 9 (respectively printer, butcher and cooker’s assistants) used
proportionally more collective strategies than the others (Laberge
et al., 2015), mainly initiated by their surroundings in critical
moments. Those apprentices were also considered better sup-
ported in terms of training in a previous study (Laberge et al.,
2012).
The collective strategies identified in the current study are not
all at the same level. Thus ‘‘asking for help” (initiated by the
apprentice) and ‘‘training given” (initiated by the colleague or
supervisor) are probably not consequent of the same kind of events
nor of the same work contexts. The two less autonomous trainees
according to an overall assessment drawn from previous studies
are those who have the most sought assistance while they faced
an unexpected event (both pharmacy inventory clerks). Further-
more, the three apprentices who received more training at the time
of an unforeseen event (discussed in the previous paragraph) are
the three who are considered having a richer social environment
highlighted by Laberge et al. (2012). It turned out that two of those
three have been more successful in their internship, as they
received a formal job position at the end of their training, despite
their low educational status.
On the matter of the protective role of social environment, data
analysis showed that collective strategies correspond to a lower
proportion of injury risks when an unexpected event occurs.
Concerning what precedes collective strategies, ‘‘training given”
8 M. Laberge et al. / Safety Science 86 (2016) 1–9strategies were often preceded by a mistake or action failure, and
this may have a role to play in occupational health and safety, rein-
forcing the importance of never letting alone a novice worker when
he/she performs a task for the first time.
4.2. Scope and limitation
The principal limitation of the current study is that the data
were not originally collected with the intention of analyzing unex-
pected events. Thus, the study was not designed with the particu-
lar precautions that would have facilitated the quantitative
analysis. For instance, the sample could have been restricted to a
single job sector to reduce the complexity of the different contexts
and interpretation of results. Moreover, it would have been pre-
ferred that apprentices have the same task assignment at W1
and W2, which would have allowed the evaluation of a learning
effect.
However, even if we had planned this analysis before, it would
have been hard to control it because we also wanted data on actual
situations and not simulated ones. Not having any controlled
parameter has the advantage of representing the reality the teach-
ers of the TST program deal with. The data from this study is
imperfect, but it illustrates the challenge of supervising those dif-
ferent young apprentices enrolled in a single vocational program:
multiple young apprentices, multiple job settings, and multiple
OHS risks. Furthermore, the findings of the present study are differ-
ent but relevant to compared to other studies on the same subject,
i.e. on possible links between job tenure, experience, learning pro-
cesses and OHS risks. The originality of this study is based on its
focus: what happens when the work does not go as planned?
The choice to make a quantitative analysis on uncontrolled obser-
vational data (actual work environment) builds on and enriches
other qualitative or more controlled studies, such the protective
role of experience studied by Cloutier et al. (2005) or the reduction
of injury risk with job tenure described by Breslin and Smith
(2006).
The cross-sectional design is another limitation of the study. For
a same unexpected event hence, the injury risk might have been
associated to the event itself (e.g. risk of being cut due to knife
characteristics) or to the consequent strategy (e.g., if the appren-
tice, after dropping an object, chose to pick it up using a hazardous
technique). Thus, the data are rather descriptive than explanatory.
Further studies are needed to elucidate causal relationships.
Work activities and the ‘‘unexpectedness” of an event cannot
completely be described by observational data. The observational
data could have been enriched by self-report measures or the
new worker reviewing the video and verbalizing her/his thought
processes data. The multicausal nature of work injuries usually
gets consensus in the scientific literature (Laberge and Ledoux,
2011), whereas in this study, the methodological design did not
facilitate the identification of multiple contributing factors because
it concentrates on immediate observable contributing factors.
Some ‘‘invisible” contributing factors related to mental strategies
for instance, have not been observed and would have been worth
considering. That being said, the strength of the study relies on
the fact that data were collected in the natural work and learning
environment, which is quite innovative for this kind of research.
This allows to overcome perceptions of stakeholders and to infer
knowledge about what actually happened.
Finally, this study remains exploratory, since the sample is very
small. It brings however insight about actual work situations that
cannot be completely caught by questionnaire or simulated situa-
tions. The small number of participants was partially compensated
by the quantity of observation data (80 h) and by the fact that
unexpected events were not sampled in the video material. Never-
theless, we believe that micro-analysis of unexpected eventsamong new workers is an important avenue for better understand-
ing why new workers have elevated injury rates and, more impor-
tantly, what can be done to mitigate the risk.
4.3. Implications
In this study we saw that several sources of constraint due to
manual handling or equipment for instance, can be associated with
a work injury risk when an unexpected event happens. However,
some resources in workplaces could be considered as protective
factors, such as social surroundings at work involved in teaching
or mentoring roles. This shows the duality associated with unex-
pected event: learning opportunity or injury risk? Some sugges-
tions can be made for school, employers and policy makers
according to the findings:
 Providing learning opportunity in actual work situations by
ensuring that the task complexity and the sources of constraint
are adjusted to the level of experience (graduated activity set
up).
 Enriching in-situ training by designing learning situations that
involve unexpected events, but under appropriate supervision
and with constant feedback in order to provide opportunity to
develop valuable strategies.
 Conducting task analysis and assessment of ‘‘what could hap-
pen that would be unexpected”, especially for manual handling
tasks in order to design training programs following the recom-
mendations stemming from Denis et al. (2013) studies.
 Paying attention to the human resources that can transfer their
experiential knowledge and also, contribute to the development
of reflexive competencies.
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